The legal position of the management board and the supervisory board in the conclusion of a bankruptcy agreement (faillissementsakkoord).

As part of the blog series: the legal positions of the corporate bodies of private limited companies in difficult financial circumstances, this blog discusses the legal position of the management board and the supervisory board in the conclusion of a bankruptcy agreement (faillissementsakkoord).

What does the board do?

Represent

In the event of bankruptcy, the board retains the authority to represent the company, including in the conclusion of a bankruptcy agreement (faillissementsakkoord). The conclusion and content of the bankruptcy agreement involve many legal aspects. For example, the general meeting could try to thwart the board from offering a bankruptcy agreement by refusing to give its consent for the bankruptcy agreement to be offered. There is debate in legal literature about whether the board can represent the company independently in such a situation. A lawyer can advise the board on the steps it can take in that case. It is therefore wise for the board to seek the assistance of a lawyer when concluding a bankruptcy agreement.

Informing and notifying

There is no dispute that the board’s duty to provide information to the shareholders’ meeting continues to exist in the event of bankruptcy. However, this duty is more limited than outside bankruptcy, because the power to manage and dispose of the assets of the company in bankruptcy lies with the trustee. The scope of what must and must not be reported is determined by the open standard of reasonableness and fairness. A serious interest of the company may still prevent the requested information from being provided to the shareholders.

Directors are also obliged to attend the verification meeting if they are summoned by the trustee. At the request of the bankruptcy judge, they must provide all information about the causes of the bankruptcy and the state of the estate. The directors also have this duty to provide information to the trustee. It is important for a director to know that the duty to provide information is not limited to the information he has received in his capacity as a director.

A director may oppose the proposal of a bankruptcy agreement offered by the trustee

A situation may arise in which the trustee considers it to be in the interests of the creditors to conclude a bankruptcy agreement. If the board considers this to be undesirable, but the trustee persists, the board may object to the trustee’s proposal for the bankruptcy agreement to be confirmed by the court-appointed trustee. For example, the board could argue that it is in the interest of the company to avoid unnecessary estate costs.

What does the supervisory board do?

Supervision and advice

Even in the event of bankruptcy, the supervisory board continues to supervise the board of directors and advise it. As the role of the board of directors is limited, the role of the supervisory board is also reduced.

Right to information

Nevertheless, the supervisory board is still entitled to timely and necessary information from the management board. For example, the supervisory board supervises the management board’s (intention to) offer a bankruptcy agreement and advises the management board in this regard.

Other (statutory) powers

It is important to note that the statutory (approval) powers of the supervisory board remain in force in the event of bankruptcy. Violation of these powers may have consequences for the legal validity of a management decision or an agreement concluded by the management board. If, for example, creditors know that the required approval of the supervisory board is lacking, it may be unacceptable to hold the company to the agreement.

In addition, the supervisory board may represent the company in a bankruptcy agreement if all directors are also unsecured creditors of the company. After all, a director should not participate in deliberations and decision-making if he has a direct or indirect personal interest that conflicts with the interests of the company.

Are you a director and would you like to offer a bankruptcy agreement? Or are you a supervisory director and would you like advice on your role in the bankruptcy agreement? Please feel free to contact us. We will be happy to advise you.

What if the works council takes too long to give its advice?

Under Section 25 of the Works Councils Act (WOR), the works council has the right to advise on important decisions made by the employer. These include reorganisations, mergers or acquisitions.

As an entrepreneur, you want clarity quickly. However, it can happen that the advice from the works council is a long time coming. How long can this take? And when can the entrepreneur proceed with their decision?

The deadline for giving advice

The law does not specify a fixed deadline within which the works council must give advice. However, the works council and the entrepreneur can agree on this together. The legislative history shows that the works council must give advice within a “reasonable period”.

What constitutes a reasonable period depends on the circumstances of the case. The following factors, among others, play a role in this:

  • the moment at which the works council received all the necessary information;
  • the complexity of the decision;
  • any external pressure, such as in the case of a bidding or tendering procedure.

The entrepreneur may also ask the works council to give its advice before a certain date. If the works council considers this period to be too short, or if it needs additional information, it must report this in good time and request a postponement. If the works council agrees to the proposed date, the entrepreneur may hold the works council to it.

What if the works council is late?

If the works council does not respond within the given deadline, this may have consequences. For example, the works council may not be able to appeal against the entrepreneur’s decision if it has not issued its advice in time. An entrepreneur may implement his decision if the works council knew that there was urgency but did not request a postponement.

Important to know: no advice is not automatically negative advice. The Zwolle-Lelystad District Court (ECLI:NL:RBZLY:2005:AU7236) ruled that if the works council deliberately does not issue any advice, Articles 25(5) and (6) of the WOR do not apply. In that case, the entrepreneur does not have to wait a month to implement his decision.

Limits to a reasonable period

The Amsterdam Court of Appeal (ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BW0499) emphasized that the works council itself is responsible for requesting information in good time. If the works council fails to do so in time, it cannot later invoke a lack of information as a reason for delay.

In a recent ruling by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2025:1794), the Enterprise Chamber clarified that an entrepreneur does not have to wait indefinitely. The entrepreneur can no longer be expected to postpone his decision if he has given the works council sufficient opportunity to advise, but the works council does not respond within a reasonable period of time. In this regard, it is essential that it is clear to all parties in advance when the advice must be issued at the latest, why that moment is necessary and what the consequences are of advising too late.

Practical advice for employers

Avoid problems by making clear agreements with the works council in advance.

  • Agree on a clear deadline with the works council.
  • Record why that deadline is necessary.
  • Communicate in good time about the consequences of late advice.

Has the entrepreneur acted carefully and given the works council sufficient time? Then he may take and implement the decision, even if the advice is not forthcoming.

In conclusion

The works council’s right to advise is an important instrument for employee participation. At the same time, the entrepreneur has the right to proceed. A good balance requires clear communication and agreements on deadlines.

Do you have any questions about the reasonable deadline or the consequences of late advice? Please feel free to contact us. We will be happy to help you find a suitable approach.

Update: postponement of wage transparency bill. What does this mean?

The introduction of the Gender Pay Transparency Directive Implementation Act has been postponed. On 7 June 2023, the European Wage Transparency Directive entered into force. The implementation of the Directive was initially supposed to be completed by 7 June 2026. However, on 15 September 2025, the minister of social affairs and employment informed that this timeframe is not feasible. The minister indicated that more time is needed to shape the national regulations and their implementation so that employers can implement the obligations effectively and with the least possible administrative burden.

The adjusted timeline is therefore as follows:

  • Before the end of 2025: presentation of the bill to the Council of State.
  • In 2026: parliamentary debate.
  • No later than 1 January 2027: the intended date of entry into force in the Netherlands.

Back up for a moment: what does the Directive even mean?

In our earlier blog, we have already discussed in detail the main obligations for employers under the Directive. Below, we briefly recapitulate these obligations:

Obligations for employers

  • Wage structures: employers should establish transparent, objective and gender-neutral wage structures. These structures should clarify how jobs are valued so that categories of equal or equivalent work can be identified. This can be used to determine whether women and men are paid equally within these categories.
  • Employee information obligation: employers with 50 or more employees must inform employees of the average wage within the category of equivalent work. Based on this, employees can check whether they earn more or less than the average within their category.
  • Duty to inform job applicants: employers must inform job applicants about the salary or pay scale of the vacancy even before the interview. During the job application, employers should not ask the applicant about the previously earned salary. This may in fact perpetuate a pay gap.
  • Reporting requirement: employers with 100 or more employees are required to report on any pay gap.
  • Pay review: in case of a pay gap of 5% or more that cannot be objectively explained or remedied within six months, the employer must conduct a pay review. This is a more comprehensive analysis of the gender pay gap, designed to further identify, remedy and prevent it.

Role for Works Council (OR) and reversal of burden of proof

  • Role for the Works Council: the Works Council (OR) has an important role to play. For instance, the Works Council has a right of consent in determining the objective, gender-neutral criteria for the transparent pay structures and in determining the measures to be taken in case of an unjustifiable pay gap.
  • Reversal of burden of proof: does an employer not comply with the above-mentioned transparency obligations or reporting obligation? In that case, a legal presumption of wage discrimination applies and the employer will have to prove that the rules on equal pay were indeed complied with.

What does the changed timeline mean for employers now?

The reporting requirement for employers with 150 or more employees will apply for the first time for calendar year 2027 (instead of 2026). Reporting is now due in 2028. The reporting requirement for employers with 100 to 149 employees remains unchanged and starts on 7 June 2030.

Employers with 150 or more employees will thus have to prepare for reporting for calendar year 2027 as early as 2026. Before then, the wage structures with the different categories of equal or equivalent work must be established. The Works Council has a right of consent on the objective criteria to be used to determine the wage structures. The Works Council also has a right to inspect the methods used in preparing the report and a right to be consulted prior to the submission of the report.

Employers would therefore do well to take advantage of the postponement of this directive and use this extra time to get their records in order to establish pay structures.

Judged too quickly: how an alleged theft cost the employer dearly

An employee with 36 years of service at a sausage factory decided to take a bag full of sausages home after one of his shifts. As he did not pay for the sausages, the employer intervened immediately upon discovering the incident. The employee was instantly dismissed for (alleged) theft. A court case followed in which he challenged his dismissal and claimed compensation. On paper, it seemed like a done deal. Yet both the subdistrict court and the court of appeal ruled that there was no urgent reason for the dismissal. The employee was awarded over two tons in compensation.

Taking sausages home had become a custom, not theft

The employee in question took home some sausages on 3 May 2024. On 6 May 2024, he was dismissed immediately. The dismissal letter stated, among other things, that the employee had taken sausages in a plastic bag after his shift without paying. The letter further noted that a crate is normally present with sausages that employees are allowed to take home free of charge, but this crate was not there on 3 May 2024.

The employee did not want to return to the workplace and claimed fair compensation. In first instance, the subdistrict court awarded him no less than €150,000 (ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2024:8684). The court ruled that there was no urgent reason for dismissal, as required under Sections 7:677 and 7:678 of the Civil Code. The employer did not have a clear policy regarding taking sausages home, and it appeared plausible that there was an established custom allowing employees to take home unsellable sausages.

The employer appealed the ruling (ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2025:2023), maintaining that the dismissal was legally valid. According to the employer, sausages were not allowed to be taken home without payment. There was no so-called “crate habit” allowing employees to take home unsellable sausages. The internal regulations also stated that theft was prohibited and that proven theft would result in immediate and irrevocable dismissal.

No pressing reason: the employer’s tolerated policy

The court of appeal ruled that there was no urgent reason justifying the dismissal. It sided with the employee, noting that the employer had a policy of tolerance. Evidence showed that a crate of sausages was regularly available at the hygiene lock for employees to take home—a practice that had been in place for years.

Although the company’s rules prohibited taking products without payment, in practice this was not treated as a violation. As a result, the alleged theft by the employee could not be established.

Furthermore, the court of appeal found that the employer had not sufficiently considered the employee’s personal circumstances. At the time of dismissal, he was 59 years old and had been employed for nearly 37 years. Apart from two official warnings regarding the smoking policy, he had an exemplary employment record. Given his age and long service, the financial impact of the dismissal would be significant.

A bag full of sausages ends up costing the employer hundreds of thousands of euros

The employee was ultimately awarded over €200,000 in compensation. In addition to fixed damages of €22,076.30 gross and transitional compensation of €52,619.01 gross, he was entitled to fair compensation of € 150.000 gross. The reason? There was no urgent cause for immediate dismissal, meaning the employer acted seriously culpably.

The court of appeal determined that fair compensation of €150,000 gross was appropriate. In setting this amount, the court considered all circumstances of the case, in line with the principles established by the Supreme Court in the New Hairstyle judgment (ECLI:NL:HR:2017:1187). (If you want to know more about the New Hairstyle judgment: read the following blog: New Hairstyle: the outcome – Wieringa Advocaten).

The court of appeal also took into account that the employee had served the company satisfactorily for 36 years and had only received two warnings, both related to the smoking policy. It was plausible that he would have continued working for the employer until his planned retirement on 13 March 2032.

Lessons for employers

A legally valid summary dismissal for theft must meet very strict requirements—it is truly a last resort. After summary dismissal, an employee loses entitlement to wages, transitional compensation, and often unemployment benefits. Because the consequences are so severe and errors can be costly, it is crucial for employers to understand their legal position, especially when there is no clear policy regarding taking items from the workplace.

If you find yourself in a similar situation or want to prevent such costly mistakes, contact us. We are happy to advise on the correct legal steps and help ensure any dismissal is handled properly.

How to handle an employee who is not performing well: a legal guide for employers

As an employer or HR professional, sooner or later you may face an employee who is not performing adequately. This can create tension: how should you handle it, what is allowed and what is not, and how can you ensure that any dismissal procedure will hold up in court? In this blog, we explain what you need to know about underperformance, improvement processes, and dismissal, with practical tips to guide you.

What does underperformance mean?

Underperformance occurs when an employee consistently fails to meet the expectations of their role. Legally, this falls under Section 7:669(3)(d) of the Dutch Civil Code. It can take many forms: delivering substandard work, being unable to handle the workload, or having difficulty interacting effectively with colleagues or clients.

It is crucial that the employee clearly understands what is expected of them. This can be communicated through the job description and concrete agreements made during performance discussions.

In practice, we often see employers act too quickly and move straight to dismissal, even when the documentation is incomplete. Courts do not grant dismissals for underperformance lightly. Acting too hastily can result in a dismissal request being rejected, leaving the employee in service or forcing the employer to pay a high fair compensation.

The improvement process: clarity, time and support

Once underperformance is identified, it is essential to implement a structured improvement process. This usually begins with a conversation where the employer openly discusses the employee’s performance and explains that it does not currently meet the job requirements. It must also be clear that if the employee wishes to remain in their role, specific improvements are necessary.

The employee is entitled to understand the expectations and must be given sufficient time to improve. One effective way to formalize this is by creating a detailed improvement plan. The plan should specify the areas requiring improvement and how progress will be measured. Ideally, the plan should align with the original job description and expected competencies.

The duration of an improvement process varies depending on factors such as the complexity of the role, the employee’s experience and qualifications, the nature of the underperformance, and the length of service (ECLI:NL:HR:2019:933). In practice, six months is a common timeframe, with interim evaluations to review progress. Everything agreed upon should be carefully documented, ideally with the employee’s signature confirming acknowledgment.

Courts also expect employers to provide sufficient support during this process. This can include coaching, training, or other resources to help the employee improve. Demonstrating that you have done everything possible to support the employee’s development is critical if the dismissal is later challenged.

What to do if underperformance persists

Employers have some discretion in determining whether an employee has adequately improved (ECLI:NL:HR:2018:182). If performance remains insufficient after several months, consider whether redeployment within the organization is possible (Article 7:669(1) of the Dutch Civil Code). This involves identifying a role better suited to the employee’s skills and experience.

If redeployment is not feasible, the employer can initiate a dismissal procedure with the subdistrict court. The court will assess whether:

  • Clear and fair expectations were set for the role.
  • The employee was clearly informed about their underperformance and the required improvements.
  • The employer provided sufficient time and support to achieve the improvements.
  • No suitable redeployment options existed within the organization.

Carefully following these steps and documenting them thoroughly significantly increases the likelihood that a dismissal will withstand legal scrutiny.

Conclusion: Handling Underperformance

Addressing underperformance is challenging, but by implementing a structured improvement process, maintaining clear communication, and meticulously documenting each step, employers can act safely and confidently. This approach ensures the employee has a fair chance to improve and that any dismissal is legally sound.

We regularly advise employers on handling underperformance and implementing improvement processes. Do not hesitate to contact us—we can guide you through the right steps and help ensure your actions are legally robust.

Employee’s right of access: what must you provide as an employer?

Our lives are increasingly taking place online. Every day, we share sensitive information via our phones, social media and digital payments. This makes protecting our personal data more important and more challenging. As an employer, you also have a major responsibility in this regard: you process your employees’ personal data and must handle it with care. Employees also have the right to know what data you process about them. But what exactly does this right of access entail?

Right of access

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been in force since 2018. This law lays down clear rules for the processing of personal data. For employers, this means that they are obliged to guarantee the privacy of their employees.

Under Article 15 of the GDPR, every data subject has the right to access their personal data. This right also applies within the employment relationship. An employee can ask their employer to access their personal data. As an employer, you must comply with this request in principle. This means that the employee has the right to access their personal data and to receive a copy of it. In addition, as an employer, you must explain the purpose for which this data is used and with whom it may be shared.

A request for access may only be refused in exceptional cases. This may be the case if the request is manifestly unfounded or excessive, or if the provision of the data would adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. In addition, the GDPR Implementation Act (Article 41 UAVG) provides for a restriction: access may be refused if it poses a risk to public safety or the prevention or detection of criminal offences. The threshold for refusing a request in whole or in part remains high.

The form in which an employer must share data with the employee always depends on the specific circumstances. As an employer, you are not always required to provide all requested documents and copies. The important thing is that the employee receives a comprehensible overview, which they can use to check whether the data is correct and is being processed lawfully. This can be done, for example, by means of a comprehensible processing overview of all personal data.

What is not covered by the right of access?

Not all documents need to be shared with the employee. A ruling by the Midden-Nederland District Court (ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2021:1354) states that internal memos containing personal thoughts of colleagues or managers are not covered by the right of access, as long as they are intended solely for internal consultation and deliberation. Examples include internal emails regarding a possible dismissal. Legal analyses based on personal data cannot be classified as personal data as such.

This changes as soon as such documents become part of the employee’s personnel file. The personnel file contains all the documents that the employer keeps about an employee. These include the employment contract, performance or assessment reports, or documents relating to absenteeism. Once documents are included in the personnel file, they are subject to the right of access. The employer must then include this information in an overview or, if that is not possible, provide a copy.

In addition, when providing information, you must not infringe on the rights and freedoms of others. This is laid down in Article 15(4) of the GDPR. An employer must take into account the privacy rights of other employees and third parties. In principle, sharing personal data of colleagues or third parties with the employee is not permitted. However, an employer may send an anonymised version so that no damage is caused to the interests of third parties (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:1219).

Practical examples

In practice, this concerns, for example, official performance reports or interviews, which form part of the personnel file. The personal data contained therein must be provided to the employee. It is often sufficient to provide an overview of the processing of personal data, with a summary of what can be found in each document. Complaints from an employee are another practical example. These often contain personal data of the employee themselves, but sometimes also of third parties. The documents that specifically relate to the employee are subject to the right of access and must therefore be provided in an overview. Information that is confidential or concerns the personal data of others, on the other hand, may be partially refused or anonymised.

In conclusion

It is important for employers to handle access requests from employees with care. In practice, we find that this often gives rise to questions or discussions. Therefore, please do not hesitate to contact us. We will be happy to advise you on how to handle an access request correctly.

Who does what in a private limited company (BV) during financial difficulties?

When a BV is in financial difficulties, the duties and powers of the company bodies change. This blog discusses these duties and powers, and those of the (prospective) administrator. Structure companies (structuurvennootschappen) are not considered here.

The executive and supervisory boards

In both good times and bad times outside of bankruptcy, the board represents the BV, determines the BV’s strategy and manages and disposes of the company’s assets. In bankruptcy, the administrator becomes exclusively responsible for the management and disposition of the BV’s assets. Furthermore, the board retains its powers.

The supervisory board supervises the management board’s policy and assists the management board with advice. Furthermore, the supervisory board can be granted additional powers in the articles of association and should be informed in writing by the management board at least once a year about the strategy, general and financial risks and the management and control system of the BV, so that the supervisory board can properly perform its function. In financially difficult times, the supervisory board should intensify its supervision. In bankruptcy, this intensity decreases again because of the appointment of the receiver.

In performing their duties, both management board and supervisory board members should be guided by the interests of the company and its affiliated enterprise. This means that management board members and supervisory board members should not take part in decision-making if they have a personal conflict of interest with the company. In financially difficult times, management board members and supervisory board members should take greater account of the interests of creditors; after all, there is a risk that creditors will not be paid. For example, if management board members or supervisory board members know or ought to know that the company cannot continue to pay its due debts after a profit distribution, they risk liability for improper performance of duties and, moreover, management board members may be jointly and severally liable for the shortfall in the company’s assets caused by the profit distribution.

The shareholders (meeting)

In principle, the shareholders’ meeting has the power to appoint or dismiss managing and supervisory directors, amend the articles of association, adopt the financial statements and decide on the dissolution, merger, demerger and/or conversion of the BV. In addition, the shareholders’ meeting has a right to information vis-à-vis the management board and the supervisory board and statutory powers (mandatory or otherwise) and all powers not assigned to other company bodies, within the limits set by law and the articles of association. When exercising these powers, the shareholders’ meeting should in principle take the corporate interest as its guideline, due to its capacity as a corporate body and its limitation by the rules of reasonableness and fairness.

Individual shareholders basically have control rights; meeting rights, agenda-setting rights, convening rights and voting rights. In principle, these rights remain in full force in financially difficult times. However, certain rights can be temporarily set aside, e.g. the pre-emptive right in the event of an issue or the profit right. This sometimes happens in cases of emergency financing. The extent to which shareholders should take corporate interests into account when exercising their rights in financially difficult times will be discussed later in this blog series.

The works council

The entrepreneur who maintains a company employing at least 50 people must establish a works council; a form of employee participation in which employees can indirectly influence company policy. The works council has an advisory right on major decisions and their implementation (with the possibility of appeal) and an advisory right on the appointment/dismissal of directors (without the possibility of appeal, although non-compliance can lead to the conclusion of “mismanagement” at the Enterprise Chamber). In addition, the works council has the right of consent on various proposed decisions to adopt, amend or revoke certain regulations. All powers remain in place during financial difficulties. In the pre-pack, even under the new Article 363(4) WCO I, the court can make the appointment of a prospective receiver conditional on the prospective receiver informing the works council.

Although the works council is not formally considered a corporate body within the meaning of Article 2:189a of the Dutch Civil Code, the prevailing doctrine is that the works council has to abide by reasonableness and fairness just like formal corporate bodies. Since the works council represents the interests of the employees employed by the company, the works council will therefore have to take into account the interests of the (company and its affiliated) company when exercising the aforementioned powers.

The (prospective) liquidator

When a BV is heading for bankruptcy, a prospective administrator may be appointed before bankruptcy. This is a person who is given the task in the Continuity of Enterprises Act I (WCO I) of looking after the interests of the company’s joint creditors. The prospective administrator is not an adviser or supervisor and does not have to follow instructions from (the board of) the BV. However, the prospective administrator does seek a solution to the BV’s financial problems together with the board of the BV outside bankruptcy.

If a suitable solution cannot be found, the prospective administrator prepares the bankruptcy, taking into account the interests of the joint creditors as much as possible. If the bankruptcy is declared, the task of the administrator is to manage and liquidate the bankruptcy estate, and to ascertain whether irregularities led to the bankruptcy, made the liquidation of the bankruptcy estate more difficult or increased the bankruptcy deficit.

Dutch Supreme Court: restraint required for deviation from contractual termination clause in long-term agreements

When a long-term partnership is suddenly terminated, the impact on the other party can be substantial. Entire business models may revolve around a single major client. Therefore, it is no surprise that the question of whether and how a long-term agreement may be terminated is a frequent source of litigation.

On 16 May 2025, the Dutch Supreme Court (ECLI:NL:HR:2025:763) ruled on the admissibility of a contractual termination clause. This blog summarises that decision and highlights its implications for contractual practice.

Continuing performance contracts

A continuing performance contract governs ongoing or repeated performances between parties. Examples include distribution, cooperation, or transport agreements. These relationships are often open-ended and do not always contain detailed termination clauses.

In earlier case law, where parties had no termination clause in place, the Supreme Court held that such contracts may in principle be terminated, provided that certain requirements are met, such as:

  • a sufficiently compelling reason for termination; and/or
  • compliance with a reasonable notice period; and/or
  • payment of compensation.

But what if the parties have agreed on a termination clause with a notice provision? What if the contract clearly says that termination is possible upon giving a ‘one month’s notice,’ but after years of cooperation that feels far too short? Can the court simply extend the notice period?

The case: DPD and Get Moving

Parcel delivery company DPD had a framework agreement with two transport companies (together “Get Moving”). The agreement included a termination clause with a one-month notice period. After ten years of cooperation, DPD invoked this provision to terminate the agreement.

Get Moving argued that the termination came as a shock. Over the years, it had become highly dependent on DPD, had structured its operations accordingly, and claimed that a longer notice period was appropriate. Get Moving sought damages as well.

First instance: contractual certainty prevails

The court dismissed the claim. The contractual arrangement was clear: one month’s notice. If the collaboration had intensified, it was up to Get Moving to renegotiate. The dependence on DPD – created by Get Moving – was insufficient to deviate from the agreed provision. Applying the clause was not “unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness” (art. 6:248(2) DCC)).

Court of Appeal: contractual gap to be filled

The Court of Appeal took a different approach. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the agreement was silent on how to deal with the consequences of intensified cooperation and increased dependency, and therefore needed to be supplemented. In other words, it ruled that the agreement contained a “gap”. The Court of Appeal “filled” this gap via the supplementary effect of reasonableness and fairness (art. 6:248(1) DCC) and concluded that DPD should have given a longer notice period. By failing to do so, DPD had breached its contractual obligations and was liable.

Supreme Court: no light-hearted replacement of the notice period

The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s judgment. It ruled that the Court of Appeal had effectively replaced the agreed notice period. That is only permissible if applying the agreed period would be unacceptable under art. 6:248(2) DCC – which was not the case here. There was no genuine contractual gap that needed to be filled.

However, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a party may, even while observing the agreed notice period, still be liable for damages. This involves supplementing the contract, not replacing the provision – for example, by imposing a duty to compensate if the clause does not address that issue.

The Supreme Court draws a clear line: deviation from an agreed termination provision is only allowed if its application is unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness (art. 6:248(2) DCC) or in case of unforeseen circumstances. Supplementation of the agreement is possible, but only outside the scope of the clause – e.g., by imposing an additional compensation obligation, not by extending the notice period itself.

Practical lesson: renegotiate in time

Long-term collaborations evolve and dependencies may grow. If contractual terms are not reviewed and amended in time, a party risks being left in a weak position in a dispute. Don’t wait until termination looms. Build in review moments during the relationship, and if the cooperation intensifies, revisit the notice period and compensation provisions while both parties still have bargaining power.

Dissolved company summoned: inadmissible

Turbo liquidation (or expedited liquidation) remains a hot issue for creditors who still have something to claim after dissolution of their creditor. In its judgment of 21 January 2025(ECLI:NL:GHARL:2025:293), the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal ruled that if a B.V., dissolved after turbo liquidation, is summoned, the claimant’s case is inadmissible. First, if there are indications of assets, a request must be made to reopen the liquidation proceedings on the basis of Section 2:23c(1) of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC).

The essence of the case

The essence of the case is as follows. A private limited company, the debtor, has a debt to a creditor. The debtor is dissolved by means of a turbo liquidation. The creditor summons the custodian of the debtor’s books and records and demands payment of the debt. The custodian claims in an incidental proceeding that the creditor should be declared inadmissible. The subdistrict court declares the creditor inadmissible. The creditor appeals this decision, as discussed below.

For the purposes of this blog, the following articles of law are relevant.

Art. 2:19(4) DCC (freely translated):

“If at the time of its dissolution the legal entity no longer has any assets, it shall then cease to exist. In such case, the board or, where Article 19a applies, the Chamber of Commerce, shall report this to the registers where the legal entity is registered.“

Art. 2:19(5) DCC (freely translated):

“The legal entity shall continue to exist after dissolution to the extent necessary for the liquidation of its assets. In documents and notices issuing from it, the following must be added to its name: in liquidation.“

Art. 2:23c(1) DCC (freely translated):

“If, after the time when the legal entity ceased to exist, a creditor or person entitled to the balance arises or the existence of a benefit appears, the court may, at the request of an interested party, reopen the liquidation and, if necessary, appoint a liquidator. In that case, the legal entity shall revive, but only for the purpose of settling the reopened liquidation. The liquidator shall be authorised to recover from each of the beneficiaries what they have received in excess from the surplus.“

Judgment of the court of appeal

The court of appeal ruled as follows (freely translated):

“3.3. [The creditor] questions the absence of assets at the time of the dissolution, but that does not make [the debtor] to be deemed (still) to exist in these proceedings. The present proceedings commenced after the dissolution of [the debtor], and in this respect differ from the case law cited by [the creditor].1 There is also no question of a bankruptcy petition.2 While a dissolved legal entity may be ‘revived’ for the purpose of settling a (reopened) liquidation, the court of appeal is of the opinion with the district court that [the creditor] should have followed the procedure of Article 2:23c (1) of the Civil Code to that end. Application thereof may also be at issue if initially no liquidation took place because no assets were known when the legal entity was dissolved. (…)
3.6. In conclusion, the appeal does not succeed.“

Comments

Like Mr Van Thiel, who wrote a note on this judgment in the JOR, I believe that some comments can be made on this judgment. I believe that it follows from Section 2:19(5) DCC that, if there are assets, the company has continued to exist for the purpose of liquidation. In that case, the registration with the Chamber of Commerce that the company has ceased to exist is a mistake in the register and does not correspond to the legal reality that the company still exists. Previous case law, including that of the Supreme Court (HR 27 January 1995, ECLI:NL:HR:1995:ZC1631), does also assume that the court, even outside proceedings in accordance with Article 2:23c(1) DCC, can rule on the question of whether there are still assets.

The argument for the court’s ruling is that legal certainty is served by clarity about whether or not a legal entity still exists after dissolution.

The consequence of the line as followed in this ruling is that in the case of regular proceedings (non-bankruptcy proceedings), the reopening procedure in accordance with Art. 2:23c (1) DCC must first be followed before substantive proceedings can be initiated against the dissolved debtor.

What does this mean for practice?

This ruling has practical implications. It becomes less easy/more complicated to recover a claim against an already turbo liquidated legal entity. The question is whether this is desirable, also in view of critical comments made in practice and by the legislator on turbo liquidation. For directors of a legal entity to be turbo liquidated, there may be one less risk; the legal entity ceases to exist (even after an unjustified) turbo liquidation, as a result of which the obligations applicable to directors of existing legal entities also end. Consider, for example, the filing obligation.

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Do you have questions about turbo liquidation, reopening liquidation or debt collection? Contact the Corporate Law team at Wieringa Lawyers. We will be happy to assist you!

Actio pauliana and a set of legal acts

The Dutch Supreme Court broadens the possibilities for liquidators to attack a set of legal acts by means of the Section 42 Fw actio pauliana (judgment of 20 June 2025, ECLI:NL:HR:2025:975). In this blog, we briefly describe the Section 42 actio pauliana and this (far-reaching) Supreme Court judgment.

Under section 42 of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act, the trustee in bankruptcy may, on behalf of the estate, annul a legal act performed by the debtor before the bankruptcy was declared, if that act was non-compulsatory and the debtor knew or should have known at the time that it would prejudice creditors.

In the case of multilateral or unilateral legal acts addressed to another person that were not performed for no consideration (i.e., for example, against payment), an additional requirement applies: the other party must also have known or should have known at the time that the creditors would be prejudiced by the act.

There is such knowledge of prejudice if, at the time of the legal act, the bankruptcy and a shortage therein were foreseeable with a reasonable degree of probability, both for the debtor and the counterparty (HR 22 December 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BI8493 and HR 7 April 2017,ECLI:NL:HR:2017:635).

Setting aside a legal act on the basis of (inter alia) Section 42 of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act is called the actio pauliana. The purpose of the actio pauliana is to restore the estate assets and prevent certain parties from being unjustly favoured at the expense of the joint creditors who are thereby prejudiced.

The text of the law, section 42, focuses on the single legal act, while in practice, legal acts are often also related to other legal acts. That is relevant for the rest of this blog.

In its judgment of 20 June 2025 (ECLI:NL:HR:2025:975), the Supreme Court ruled that a combination of legal acts (several related legal acts) can also fall within the scope of Section 42 (freely translated):

“3.3

Section 42 of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act takes the single legal act as its starting point. However, the circumstances of the case may bring that under the scope of section 42 not only a single legal act can be assessed, but also a coherent whole of legal acts as such, i.e. considered as a whole. In this connection, the Supreme Court has previously ruled that, for the application of Section 42, legal acts may form such a coherent whole that their (adverse) consequences must be assessed in connection with each other.4 [4: See the Supreme Court Judgement of 19 December 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BG1117, paragraph 3.6.2].

It follows from the above that, when applying Section 42 of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act to a connected set of legal acts, what matters is whether this connected set as such has prejudiced creditors. This is consistent with the fact that the assessment of the knowledge of prejudicing of creditors is also applied to the connected whole of legal acts. What matters is that at any moment when performing a legal act that is part of the connected whole of legal acts, the condition has been met that the debtor and, in the case of Section 42, Subsection 2 of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act, the person with or vis-à-vis whom the debtor performed the legal act, knew or should have known that this connected whole of legal acts would result in the prejudicing of creditors. In line with the foregoing, it is also consistent that the assessment of the non-obligation that Article 42 sets as a condition for annulment is also applied to the connected whole of legal acts.“

At first sight, the above does seem logical. It was already clear that Section 42 of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act can also be applied to a set of legal acts. What is relevant is that the Supreme Court applies the above-described criteria for a successful application of actio pauliana, which are written for the single legal act, to the combination of legal acts. The requirements of prejudice and knowledge of prejudice then relate to the set of legal acts as a whole. It even goes so far that the knowledge of prejudicing creditors exists if that knowledge existed at any time (so not necessarily from the beginning) when the legal acts were performed. And also the criterion for application of section 42, that the legal act was performed without obligation, is applied by the Supreme Court at the level of the whole set (the combination) of legal acts.

This seems to considerably expand the scope of the actio pauliana and thus the toolbox of the bankruptcy trustee.

Criticism

Verstijlen is critical of this judgment in his note (NJ 2025/188). The mere fact that knowledge of prejudice exists in one act does not automatically mean that the entire set of legal acts is tainted. The moment at which that knowledge exists is relevant. Not every combination constitutes a set. And this judgment opens up the possibility of circumventing the restrictive Section 47 of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act, which deals with the annulment of mandatorily performed legal acts.

Practical implications for practice

For bankruptcy trustees, this judgment means a broadening of the possibility to destroy (a set of) legal acts. For distressed companies and their counterparties, directors, and advisers, it mainly means: more risk, more vigilance.

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